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I. Introduction
The United States is engaged in a national debate over same-sex
marriage. While there are undeniably numerous privileges and benefits that
marriage bestows—a central argument in the fight for marriage equality—
there are certain protections for families that rest outside of legal marriage.
Same-sex couples that choose not to marry should be entitled to the same
protections for their families as the families of heterosexual couples who
choose not to marry. As LGBT activists often clarify, the fight for marriage
equality is the fight to secure the same state sanctioned opportunities as
heterosexual couples—the right to choose whether to marry or not. Those
same-sex couples that choose not to marry should be treated the same as
heterosexual couples who choose not to marry.
In Levy v. Louisiana,1 a principal example of family protections
unrelated to marriage can be seen in the legal treatment of children born to
non-married couples.2 It has long been established that children should not
be treated differently based on the legal status of their parents’
relationship.3 However, there are substantial differences between same-sex
families4 and heterosexual families that make it a very real possibility that
courts will read more into the decision of same-sex couples not to marry
1. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (finding that denying dependent,
illegitimate children their benefits following the wrongful death of their mother constitutes
discrimination against them). In Levy, the Court considered whether Louisiana could
statutorily preclude illegitimate children from recovering under its wrongful death statute.
Id. at 69–70. Applying the rational basis test, the Court held that the Louisiana court’s
construction of the wrongful death statute as denying recovery to illegitimate children
invidiously discriminated against these children for no rational reason. Id. at 72; see also
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 123 (1976) [hereinafter “The 1975 Term"] (discussing, in general terms, the Levy case
and others in this line of jurisprudence).
2. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
3. See The 1975 Term, supra note 1 (discussing the outcome of the Levy case).
4. For the purposes of this article I will use the phrase “same-sex families” to refer to
families headed by same-sex couples.
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than they would for heterosexual couples making the same decision. The
potential differential treatment between children of an unmarried same-sex
couple and children of an unmarried heterosexual couple is most evident in
establishing legal parentage. For heterosexual couples, the parent-child
relationship can be easily assessed at any time by a simple DNA test, while
for obvious reasons the same is not true for same-sex couples. In the samesex family context, the parent-child relationship for at least one of the
partners will never be automatic or easily and objectively ascertainable.
Thus, there is a strong desire for courts to find an easily determinable,
bright line proxy for biology. Enter same-sex marriage and presuming (or
more importantly not presuming) legal parenthood for children in same-sex
families based on marital status. In what can only be explained as
unfortunate irony, the fight to increase the legal shield for same-sex
families by securing the rights and benefits of legal marriage may instead
sharpen the legal sword against these families if they choose not to marry.
New York, the most recent state to legalize same-sex marriage,
provides the perfect case study.5 The current jurisprudence of assessing
legal parentage for same-sex families in New York is quite complex.
Therefore, it is easy to appreciate the attractiveness of a clear standard such
as deriving legal parent-child status directly from the same-sex couple’s
marital status. While only time will tell if New York courts give into this
imprudent temptation, there is a suggestion from recent cases that they will.
I argue against this impulse and provide a discussion of preferable,
alternative proxies for biology that focus not on marital status, but rather on
the more appropriate best interests of the child.
This article focuses principally on the current status of New York law
regarding parentage determination for the purposes of child
custody/visitation as well as child support in the context of a lesbian
relationship. Part I of this paper provides a very brief general discussion of
legal parentage in the context of same-sex families and then focuses on
child support assessment for a non-biological, non-adoptive parent. Part II
outlines the role marriage rights play in determining parentage for the
purposes of securing child support. Part III discusses the intersection of
child custody/visitation jurisprudence and child support jurisprudence in
New York, and utilizes a critique of New York Court of Appeals
“companion”6 cases, Debra H. v. Janice R.7 and H.M. v. E.T.,8 to highlight
5. H.R. A08354, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
6. The word companion is placed in quotes to signal that even though the New York
Court of Appeals handed down the cases together, the legal theories underlying them are
quite different. This is further developed in Part III.
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the importance of relying on the same parentage standard both in
adjudication of parental rights (child custody/visitation) and parental
obligations (child support). Part IV proposes and evaluates possible
parentage standards that could be applied in both child custody/visitation
adjudication as well as child support adjudication that do not focus on
marital status. Finally, Part V briefly concludes.
II. Determining Legal Parentage for Non-Biological Lesbian Mothers For
Child Custody/Visitation and Child Support
The 2000 Census reported that 34.3% of lesbian couples were raising
children.9 New technologies have gradually increased the opportunity for
7. See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 194 (N.Y. 2010) (ruling that the
decision of whether to expand the category of persons who have standing to seek child
custody is a subject to be decided by the legislature). In Debra H., the court considered
whether to expand the category of persons who have standing to seek both child custody and
visitation beyond those persons presently permitted by the Domestic Relations Law. Id. at
596. The former same-sex domestic partner of child’s biological mother brought the claim
before the court seeking legal and physical custody of a child. Id. at 586. The child was
born during the parties’ valid Vermont civil union but conceived through artificial
insemination prior to the parties’ union. Id. The court let the legislature decide how to
expand the category of persons who have standing to seek child custody. Id. at 597.
8. See H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 210 (N.Y. 2010) (determining that family court
does have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a biological mother’s petition for child
support). In H.M., the court considered a birth mother’s petition to have her former samesex partner adjudicated as a parent of a child conceived by artificial insemination, in an
attempt to seek retroactive child support. Id. at 207. The court began by determining that
the Family Court unquestionably has the subject matter jurisdiction to ascertain the support
obligations of a female parent. Id. at 288. From this determination the court found that the
Family Court has the inherent authority to ascertain, in certain cases, whether the female
respondent is a child’s parent. Id. This finding allowed the court to rule that the Family
Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate biological mother’s petition for child
support. Id. at 209.
9. See Jason N.W. Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption is the Second-Best
Option: The Case for Legislative Reform as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples in
the Face of Continued Marriage Inequality, 11 SCHOLAR 57, 58 (2008) (arguing that the best
way to secure protection for same-sex parenting situations is to take legislative action
because such legislation results in a more predictable and enduring framework for providing
children the legal protection of both parents); see also Ellen C. Perrin, Technical Report:
Co-parent or Second Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS
341, 341 (Feb. 2002), available at http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint
/pediatrics;109/2/341.pdf (last visited April 08, 2012) (arguing that no data suggests any risk
associated with growing up in a same-sex family and that parent’s sexual orientation does
not factor into the parent’s ability to provide a supportive home environment) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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lesbian couples to raise biologically related children in addition to adoption.
Among lesbian couples, a majority utilizes some method of artificial
insemination,10 one of the oldest and most common forms of assistedreproduction technology.11 In terms of determining parentage in these
family compositions, as a consequence of artificial insemination, the
biological mother automatically gains parental status, while the nonbiological parent must seek out legal parentage.12 Some states have
artificial insemination statutes that bestow automatic parentage on the
spouse who consented to the artificial insemination, but these heteronormative statutes are limited to a husband who consents to his wife’s invitro fertilization and do not provide automatic parentage for lesbian
parents in the identical position.13 Only the District of Columbia and New
Mexico have explicitly extended these laws to lesbian couples.14 The only
other way to receive automatic parentage rights is by way of the marriage
presumption—the presumption that both individuals in a married
relationship are legal parents of any children born during the marriage.
This is, however, limited to couples living in states that recognize same-sex
marriage, or provide a marriage-like status.15

10. See Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in
a Brave New World, 20 J. JUV. L. 1, 2 (1999) (discussing the current parenting issues facing
the many same-sex couples, focusing on the status of the same-sex partners of biological or
legal parents).
11. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 84–108 (1995) (examining the controversial and
complex policy issues surrounding current reproductive technology and how medical
advances are challenging traditional ideas of reproductive rights); see also Karin Mika &
Bonnie Hurst, One Way to Be Born? Legislative Inaction and the Posthumous Child, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 993, 994 (1996) (arguing that the rights and responsibilities related to
posthumous children are related to procreation and that legislation must resolve the issues
related to posthumous children); see generally Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Thinking About the
Law of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 27 WIS. J. FAM. L. 123, 123–29 (2007) available
at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&Section=family_law_section&ContentID=75102 (discussing the new uses of assisted
reproductive technology and the lack of legislature’s actions in resolving disputes involving
these relatively-new technologies).
12. See Doskow, supra note 10, at 2 (arguing that the birth of a child only creates a
legal relation to the biological mother, while the same-sex partner of the mother can become
a legal parent through either second-parent adoption or a Uniform Parentage Act petition).
13. See sources and discussion infra Part IV.A.
14. See sources and discussion infra notes 122−23.
15. See sources and discussion infra Part III.
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Adoption is another common method used by lesbians.16 It is
important to differentiate between joint adoption, in which both individuals
establish legal adoptive parenthood over a child, and second-parent
adoption, in which one parent is already the legal, biological parent—either
through surrogacy, artificial insemination, or from a previous relationship—
and the biological parent’s partner must actively seek to establish a legal
relationship with the child.17 Although there is a way for non-biological
same-sex parents to clearly establish legal parenthood (through adoption, or
through same-sex marriage if the state allows), there are many lesbian nonbiological parents who, for a variety of reasons, do not legally establish
adoptive parenthood and are not in a state that recognizes same-sex
marriage. Thus, there are many possible scenarios in which at the
dissolution of a lesbian relationship one partner can find herself without any
legal tie to the child they called their own. This complicates both the rights
of this partner to custody/visitation as well as this partner’s obligations to
provide child support.
As a quick aside, it is important to quickly acknowledge how ensuring
financial support of children is a high priority in our country’s social
policy.18 Insufficient child support is a leading cause of child poverty.19
Furthermore, children who receive child support perform better
academically, and are more likely to finish school and attend college.20
Although child support laws are left to the states, the federal government
has stepped in and required states to implement stronger child support
enforcement measures.21 In 1996, Congress mandated that states enact the
16. See Doskow, supra note 10, at 3–4 (discussing how the same-sex partner of a
biological parent can become a legal parent of the child through an independent adoption
process).
17. See id. (distinguishing between domestic agency adoption (i.e. joint adoption) and
second-parent adoption).
18. See Drew A. Swank, The National Child Non-Support Epidemic, 2003 MICH. ST.
DCL L. REV. 357, 363–65 (2003) (discussing a brief history of child support enforcement).
19. See id. at 361 (“The possibility of a child escaping poverty often depends on
whether or not the owed child support is being paid.”).
20. See Michael L. Hopkins, “What is Sauce for the Gander is Sauce for the Goose:”
Enforcing Child Support on Former Same-Sex Partners Who Create a Child Through
Artificial Insemination, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 219, 222 (2006) (discussing how nonpayment of child support is the nation’s greatest source of financial insecurity because
children who do not receive child support are less likely to finish high school or attend
college).
21. See Swank, supra note 19, at 365 (explaining how the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 dramatically changed the nation’s child
support system by requiring employers to report new hires in an effort to track delinquent
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Uniform Interstate Family Support Act in order to receive federal funds in
an attempt to make child support awards more uniform and to increase
levels and efficiency in proceedings.22
Child support can be sought either in an action by the partner with
custody of the child following the partnership’s dissolution, or in an action
by a governmental body attempting to recoup prior or prevent future child
support payments, where the child or the custodial parent is receiving
public support.23 Courts are charged with the responsibility of interpreting
and applying state family law statutes, and because most are drafted as
general guidelines, the role of the court is substantial in determining
parentage and the rights and obligations attendant to that status.24
III. Impact of Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships
As briefly discussed in the preceding section, the legal nature of the
lesbian partnership directly impacts parental determination, which in turn
impacts child custody/visitation and support. In addition, the nature of state
recognition is far more complex, however, than states recognizing same-sex
marriage versus states that do not. Therefore, the possible scenarios for
non-biological parents seeking legal parentage are numerous and complex.
For clarity and ease of argument I divide this section into the following
categories: Looking first at the legal recognition of the relationship factor, I
separate my discussion into (a) same-sex marriage states; (b) civil
unions/domestic partnerships states; and (c) no recognized legal status
states. Second, looking at methods used to formally create legal parentage,
I separate my discussion into (a) establishing parentage through secondparent adoption; and (b) establishing parentage through adoption. Finally, I
discuss the scenario of no legal relationship between the couple and no
legal adoptive relationship between the non-biological partner and child.

parents).
22. See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2011) (requiring
certain statutorily prescribed procedures to improve effectiveness in child support
enforcement).
23. See Hopkins, supra note 20, at 222–23 (explaining traditional child support
obligations and laws).
24. See id. (explaining the broad discretion granted to state court judges to resolve
child support cases, which allows the judge to provide for a child of same-sex partners
because the child’s situation is not covered by state statute).
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A. Marriage 25

Marriage-like recognition of same-sex relationships theoretically
provides automatic legal parentage by way of the legal connection between
the parents. For example, a legally married lesbian couple:
[One] engaging in reproduction through artificial insemination would
not need to take any steps at all to protect the rights of the partner who
did not carry the child, as the latter would be considered to be in the
same position as the husband of a heterosexual woman who is
inseminated with the semen of another man [whereby the law] . . .
deems the husband the legal parent of [the] child born as a result of the
insemination, despite the absence of genetic connection.26

Thus, extending this marital presumption to lesbian couples, a partner in a
legal same-sex marriage is presumed to be the parent and would have
standing to contest custody/visitation as well as be potentially liable for
child support.

25. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MARRIAGE EQUALITY & OTHER RELATIONSHIP
RECOGNITION LAWS, http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Relationship_Recognition_
Laws_Map(1).pdf (last visited April 8, 2012) [hereinafter MARRIAGE EQUALITY] (showing
that same-sex couples can marry in Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, Vermont, and the District of Columbia, while Maryland recognizes marriages
between same-sex couples entered into in other jurisdictions) (on file with the Washington
and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 308(b) (West 2011) (revealing that California recognized marriages between same-sex
couples entered into prior to November 5, 2008, but same-sex marriages after that date are
not accorded the designation of marriage, but are instead granted the state-conferred rights
and responsibilities of marriage); see also Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 64 (Cal. 2009)
(holding that marriages between same-sex couples entered into in California prior to
November 5, 2008 are valid for all purposes); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, SB
54, AND SAME-SEX COUPLES WHO MARRY OUTSIDE OF CALIFORNIA,
www.nclrights.org/SB54FAQ (last visited April 8, 2012) (clarifying the rights of same-sex
couples that marry outside the state of California) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
26. Doskow, supra note 10, at 4–5.
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B. Civil Unions/Domestic Partnerships27
In most states that provide civil unions or domestic partnerships, the
rights and responsibilities bestowed by that status are very similar to those
of marriage, particularly with respect to parentage determination for
children born during the relationship.28 Thus, similar to same-sex marriage
states, in most of these civil union/domestic partnership states, the nonbiological partner is presumed to be a legal parent. For example, in Baker
v. State, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that “the State is
constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common
benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.”29
Soon after, the Vermont legislature formally defined these protections by
enacting the Civil Union Act, affording same-sex couples all the legal
benefits of marriage without the specific status declaration.30 One provision
of the Civil Union Act specifically relates to parentage:
The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom
either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union,
shall be the same as those of a married couple, with respect to a child of
whom either spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage.31

27. See MARRIAGE EQUALITY, supra note 25 (comparing states that permit same-sex
couples to receive all the benefits of marriage by entering into civil unions, such as
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Oregon, and
Washington to states that only grant part of the same rights to same-sex couples, such as
Colorado, Maine, and Wisconsin); see, e.g. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2011) (“The
rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of
them shall be the same as those of spouses.”); see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31(e) (West
2011) (discussing the rights and responsibilities of civil union couples). The statute states:
The rights of civil union couples with respect to a child of whom either becomes
the parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a
married couple with respect to a child of whom either spouse or partner in a civil
union couple becomes the parent during the marriage.
Id.
28. See MARRIAGE EQUALITY, supra note 25 (explaining the similarities between
rights bestowed at marriage and rights conferred upon those in a civil union or domestic
partnership).
29. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 868 (Vt. 1999) (ruling that excluding same-sex
couples from benefits commonly obtained through marriage violated the common benefit
clause of the state constitution).
30. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 (2002) (showing how the Vermont
legislature’s enactment of the Civil Union Act afforded same-sex couples the same benefits
as those held by married couples).
31. Id. § 1204(f).
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Therefore, a Vermont civil union provides a rebuttable marriage-like
presumption that the non-biological, non-adoptive parent is a legal parent.32
C. No Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships
Finally, the following thirty-two states provide no legal recognition for
same-sex couples: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.33 It is
important to note that a separate issue apart from a state’s own laws
regarding same-sex marriage concerns recognition of other states’ same-sex
marriage laws. Currently, only Maryland fully acknowledges out-of-state
same-sex marriages.34
In the absence of a legal parent-child relationship automatically
formed via the legal relationship between the same-sex partnership, legal
parental status can be sought through adoption. It is important to
distinguish between joint and second-parent adoption. The term joint
adoption generally refers to a couple together adopting a child who is not
the biological or pre-existing adoptive child of either of them.
i. Joint Adoption
Formal adoption provides standing to contest child custody/visitation
as well as provides a prima facie case of liability against a former same-sex
partner to pay child support. However, not all states allow homosexuals to
adopt. Until very recently Florida law expressly prohibited “homosexual”
individuals from adopting.35 Similarly, as of 2000, Mississippi law
expressly prohibits “adoption by couples of the same gender.”36 Utah
prohibits adoption “by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is
32. Id.
33. See MARRIAGE EQUALITY, supra note 25 (providing a list of states that do not
legally recognize same-sex couples at all).
34. Id.
35. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2002) (“No person eligible to adopt under
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”).
36. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2011) (“Adoption by couples of the same
gender is prohibited.”).
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not a legally valid and binding marriage.”37 Utah defines cohabitation as
“residing with another person and being involved in a sexual relationship
with that person.”38 Even when available, joint-adoption is not ideal in the
majority of lesbian families where one of the partners is already the
biological parent because it requires severing the pre-existing relationship
between the biological parent and child in order to allow both individuals to
jointly adopt the child.39
ii. Second Parent Adoption
Some states explicitly permit legal adoption by a second parent in a
same-sex relationship without terminating the legal status of the biological
parent.40 In these states, “the adoptive parent stands in parity with the
37. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2011).
38. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-103(10) (West 2011).
39. See In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163, 1166–67 (Wash. 1973) (stating that
the purpose of these types of severing provisions is to give “the adopted child a ‘fresh start’
by treating him as the natural child of the adoptive parent, and severing all ties with the
past”); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNI. STATE LAWS, UNIF. ADOPTION ACT
(1994), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/uaa94.pdf (last visited
April 8, 2012) (noting that the cut-off provision which terminates the biological parent’s
right can be avoided if the biological parent terminates his or her right to become a joint
adoptive parent with the partner) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice); see also Jason C. Beekman, Same-Sex Second-Parent Adoption
and Intestacy Law: Applying the Sharon S. Model of “Simultaneous” Adoption to ParentChild Provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 148–49 (2010)
(discussing the complexity of severing ties with the biological parent to allow adoption from
the same-sex partner).
40. See FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, STATE-BY-STATE: SECOND PARENT ADOPTION
LAWS
(2012),
http://www.familyequality.org/get_informed/equality_maps/secondparent_adoption_laws/ (last visited April 8, 2012) (stating that second-parent adoption is
available by statute in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 9000(b) (West 2011) (allowing only registered domestic partners to adopt without
terminating the legal status of the biological parent); see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 45a-724(a)(3) (West 2011) (stating that a joint adoption is allowable without requiring a
severance of the existing legal relationship); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b)
(2002) (allowing joint adoption without severing any existing legal relationships); see also
Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 562–63 (Cal. 2003) (ruling that adoption does not
always require termination of the birth parent’s rights and that the independent adoption
laws make second-parent adoptions valid); see also In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 862 (D.C.
1995) (holding that a member of a same-sex couple is allowed to adopt his or her partner’s
child without termination of parental rights); see also In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 898 (Ill.
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biological parent and has all the rights and responsibilities that flow from
legal parenthood.”41 Second-parent adoption is modeled on stepparent
adoption, a statutory scheme that allows a biological (or adoptive) parent’s
spouse to adopt a child without terminating the biological parent’s legal
rights.42 Although most states are not explicit in terms of whether secondparent adoption is available for same-sex families, some states do explicitly
provide for same-sex second-parent adoption by statute, while others
provide for same-sex second-parent adoption through appellate court
decisions.43 Vermont is a unique example because it provides protection for
same-sex families through a family law code that is gender
neutral rather
44
than specifically applying only to homosexual couples. The law states
that “[i]f a family unit consists of a parent and the parent’s partner, and
adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner of a parent may
adopt a child of the parent. Termination of the parent’s parental rights is
unnecessary in an adoption under this subsection.”45

App. Ct. 1995) (summarizing a Vermont law that allows unmarried persons to adopt if the
adoption is in the best of the interest of the child because the adoption had not been
prohibited); see also In re Infant K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that public policy can be violated when the denying legal protections to a
relationship with a child is inconsistent with the child’s best interest); see also In re
M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270–71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that Indiana law does not
require that a petitioning adoptive parent be a legal relative of the adoptive parent of the
child); see also In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993) (stating that Massachusetts
law does not preclude same-sex couples from jointly adopting child); see also In re H.N.R.,
666 A.2d 535, 540–41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (ruling that children can be adopted
by a mother’s same-sex partner without terminating the mother’s paternal rights); see also In
re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405–06 (N.Y. 1995) (stating that same-sex couples have standing
to become adoptive parents without terminating the biological mother’s parental rights); see
also In re R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002) (determining that same-sex partners were
entitled an opportunity to demonstrate cause as to whether the purpose of relinquishment of
the parental rights requirement would be otherwise fulfilled or was unnecessary); see also In
re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (stating that denying same-sex partners, as a
class, the security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent serves no
legitimate state interest).
41. Margaret S. Osborne, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage for
Lesbian Co-Parents, 49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (2004).
42. See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child:
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 201, 205 (2009) [hereinafter Parentage Laws] (arguing that existing adoption
statutes should be interpreted to permit adoption by a mother’s same-sex partner).
43. See sources cited supra note 43 (listing cases that held adoption was possible
without severing pre-existing legal relationships).
44. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2011).
45. Id.
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In a family structure in which only one parent is the biological parent,
second-parent adoption is often thought of as the best solution to legalize
46
the relationship between the non-biological parent and the child.
However, second-parent adoptions are far from a panacea; second-parent
adoptions are far more burdensome than courts and commentators
acknowledge.47 Part IV below further discusses some of the problems in
placing too much of an emphasis on second-parent adoption as the New
York Court of Appeals did in Debra H.
IV. The Wrong Parental Standard: Requiring Second-Parent Adoption or
Marriage to Gain Legal Parentage
The New York Court of Appeals handed down Debra H. and H.M. the
same day—May 4, 2010. Both involved lesbian families.48 Both were
child-related cases; Debra H. addressed a petitioner seeking visitation, and
H.M. addressed a petitioner seeking child support.49 Both were to be
treated under a similar “best interest of the child” standard.50 Yet, these
46. See Osborne, supra note 41, at 367–68 (describing other non-litigious options for
co-parents, including co-parenting agreements, pre-birth decrees, and visitation agreements
subsequent to the dissolution of the relationship). In her article, Osborne discusses cases in
which courts found co-parenting agreements to be simple, contract-like legal documents
outlining the particular rights and responsibilities of each parent. Id. at 370–71. Yet, courts
often refuse to enforce co-parenting agreements on the grounds that biological parents
cannot contract away any portion of their constitutional right to guide the upbringing of their
children. Id. Pre-birth decrees attempt to adjudicate parenthood from conception (be it by in
vitro sperm donation, surrogacy, or other method). Id. at 371–72. This option is only
available to those parents seeking to legally solidify their relationship with an as yet unborn
child. Id. Visitation agreements, even if prepared preemptively before the dissolution of a
relationship, are often unenforceable because courts are reluctant to allow parties to
independently contract for child custody without a court applying a best interest of the child
standard. Id. at 372–74. Despite these other attempts to avoid a post-dissolution adversarial
court determination of parental rights, second-parent adoption is the most robust nonlitigious option to formally establish a legal parent–child relationship. Id. at 367–68.
47. See sources and discussion infra notes 80–84 (discussing second-parent
adoptions).
48. See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 186 (2010) (stating that the biological
mother, Janice R., entered into a civil union with Debra H.); see also H.M. v. E.T., 930
N.E.2d 206, 207 (2010) (stating that the case involved “a biological parent seeking child
support from her former same-sex partner”).
49. See Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 186 (“She sought joint legal and physical custody of
M.R., restoration of access and decision making authority with respect to his upbringing, and
appointment of an attorney for the child.”); see also H.M., 930 N.E.2d at 207 (stating that the
petitioner sought child support).
50. See Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 194 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70(a) (MCKINNEY
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cases are anything but “companion” cases. Taken together, these cases
establish a legal regime for lesbian partners where, for the purposes of
contesting child custody, the court takes a narrow view of legal parenthood
and requires that the non-biological partner formally adopt the child
through second-parent adoption. Nevertheless, for securing child support
against a non-biological parent, the court takes a much more expansive
view of legal parenthood.
Debra H. held that absent a second-parent adoption, or valid same-sex
marriage, a non-biological parent does not have standing to seek custody or
visitation with the child she helped raise.51 The compelling facts of Debra
H. are common to these types of cases. Respondent Janice R. conceived
through artificial insemination and gave birth to M.R. after Janice R. and
Debra H. entered into a civil union in the state of Vermont.52 While Debra
H. did not take the step of formally adopting M.R. as a second parent, for
much of his life, Janice R. held Debra H. out—both to the world and to
M.R.—as M.R.’s mother, and the two women raised M.R. together until
they separated in 2006.53 Indeed, even after they separated, Debra H.
continued to act as M.R.’s parent.54 It was not until May 2008, when M.R.
was almost five years old, that Janice R. abruptly and unilaterally sought to
sever all forms of contact between Debra H. and M.R.55
The New York Court of Appeals was quite divided in its analysis in
Debra H., evidenced by four separate opinions. However, the majority
clearly expressed the court’s reaffirmation of the court’s precedent
established in Alison D. v. Virginia M.56 nearly twenty-years prior. In
Alison D., the Court of Appeals of New York addressed whether a nonbiological, non-adoptive “stranger” had standing to seek visitation under
applicable New York domestic relations law.57 The facts of Alison D.,
2012)); H.M. v. E.T., 906 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (evaluating the best
interest of the child).
51. See Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 196–97 (upholding the parental rights of the nonbiological mother based on the fact that the couple entered into a Vermont civil union, and
comity principles required that the court follow Vermont law). Therefore, based on marital
status, the New York Court of Appeals ultimately held that Debra H. was the legal parent of
M.R. and thus entitled to seek custody and visitation with her son. Id.
52. Id. at 186.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29–30 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that a
woman who had a live-in relationship with the child’s mother was not a legal “parent”).
57. Id. at 28.
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similar to the facts of Debra H., are quite compelling. Together Alison D.
and respondent Virginia M. planned for the conception and birth of the
child and agreed to share jointly in all the privileges and obligations of
parenthood.58 The child was given Alison’s last name as his middle name
and Alison shared in both pre-birth and post-birth expenses.59 In fact, until
the child was two years and four months old, both individuals jointly cared
for and made decisions regarding the child.60 Yet, the court followed a
bright–line rule, holding that without a formal second-parent adoption,
“although [Alison] apparently nurtured a close and loving relationship with
the child, she is not a parent.”61
Lower New York courts have long criticized Alison D.62 In 2008, a
New York trial court stated: “In the seventeen years since Alison D., under
constraint of that decision, courts have continued to deny the proactive
efforts of a non-biological, non-adoptive domestic partner or spouse to
obtain custodial rights, notwithstanding the ties that may have developed
between that person and the child.”63 The court argued, “[I]f the concern of
both the legislature and the Court of Appeals is what is in the child’s best
interest, a formulaic approach to finding that a ‘parent’ can only mean a
biologic or adoptive parent may not always be appropriate.”64
Despite Debra H. presenting the perfect opportunity for the Court of
Appeals to revise its ruling in Alison D., the court instead authoritatively
rejected arguments that Alison D. should be overruled because it is
outmoded, unworkable, and does not take into account the best interests of
the child.65 The court remained stubbornly steadfast, holding that “Alison
D., in conjunction with second-parent adoption, creates a bright line rule
that promotes certainty in the wake of domestic breakups.”66 Preferring an
arguably naive sense of certainty and predictability over the child’s best
interest in maintaining a meaningful relationship, the court refused to utilize
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)
(citing several cases which criticized Alison D. as well as several cases that followed a
theory of equitable estoppel to avoid the harsh results of Alison D.’s bright-line rule).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 508.
65. See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 201 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J.,
concurring) (noting that Alison D. should be “overruled as outmoded and unworkable”).
66. Id. at 191.

230

18 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 215 (2012)

its common law and equitable powers to expand its definition of a parent to
include “de facto” parentage or parenthood “by estoppel.”67 Granted, an
equitable or functional analysis is more subjective than biology; however,
as Judge Smith, concurring in Debra H and H.M., correctly understands,
“[I]t is not possible for both members of a same-sex couple to become
biological parents of the same child . . . . These differences seem . . . to
warrant different treatment.”68 Different treatment does not mean worse
treatment; requiring a lesbian couple to seek a formal second-parent
adoption is much more of a burden than the burden on heterosexual couples
to take a DNA test. Requiring marriage would likewise be problematic.
Despite what the New York Court of Appeals believes, a bright-line rule
finding legal parentage only by a second-parent adoption or legal marriage
is inappropriate, unfair, and overly burdensome. There are better proxies
for biology that the court failed to consider, which I fully address and
evaluate in Part IV.
In the end, however, the court found Debra H. had standing to seek
custody, recognizing her parenthood by way of the Vermont civil union she
entered into with Janice R.69 Based on the end result, it might appear as if
this opinion expands the rights of gay parents. In reality, however, the case
limited the rights of gay parents by finding that a child has no legal
relationship with the non-biological parent unless the parents married each
other (or entered into a civil union, domestic partnership, or other state
recognized “marriage-like” status) or finalized a second-parent adoption.
Relying on the status of the parents’ relationship, the court found the civil
union “as determinable as whether there had been a second-parent
adoption,” because “both civil union and adoption require the biological or
adoptive parent’s legal consent, as opposed to the indeterminate implied
consent featured in the various [equitable] tests proposed to establish de
facto or functional parentage.”70 However, does Janice R. holding Debra H.
67. Id. at 192–93.
68. Id. at 205 (Smith, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 196–97 (deciding narrowly that the court would recognize a civil union
for this specific purpose and not the issue of comity for Vermont law).
70. Id. Judge Graffeo made a similar argument in his concurrence. See id. at 197
(Graffeo, J., concurring). Graffeo noted:
Rather than employing an ‘equitable estoppel’ or ‘in loco parentis’ basis for
establishing parental status, Alison D. created a bright-line rule that made it
possible for biological and adoptive parents to clearly understand in what
circumstances a third party could obtain status as a parent and have standing
to seek visitation or custody with a child.
Id.
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out to the world as M.R.’s mother, and the two women together raising
M.R. for over two years, not convey a determinable level of consent?71
And, is the court so blinded by the desire to have a “bright line” rule that it
completely ignores how far they stray from the “best interests of the child,”
the cornerstone standard of family law? In Part IV below, I further combat
the court’s assertion that it was forced to maintain the Alison D. parental
requirements of biology or adoption for the proffered reasons of certainty
and predictability.
While the court finds fault in other potential theories of parenthood, it
does not adequately acknowledge the faults in requiring a second-parent
adoption. Instead, the court merely pointed to its thought process behind
opening the door for same-sex second-parent adoption in In re Jacob.72
The court “stressed that permitting such second-parent adoptions
‘allows . . . children to achieve a measure of permanency with both parent
figures and avoids the sort of disruptive visitation battle [the court] faced in
[Alison D.].’”73 However, there is a difference between allowing secondparent adoption and requiring it. Heterosexual parents simply need to take
a DNA test to be considered a parent with standing to contest
custody/visitation. Yet, the court is comfortable requiring homosexual
parents to go through a second-parent adoption, a process that is timeconsuming, expensive, and intrusive.74 The couple must hire a lawyer and
participate in what will likely be a long, drawn-out process. Many families
remain unfamiliar with these procedures, or even if familiar with them, are
unable to amass the resources necessary to fully pursue them. It can also be
emotionally taxing; until a judge signs the adoption decree, the nonbiological mother and her child are legal strangers.75

71. See id. at 186−88 (examining the answer to this question).
72. Id. at 190 (“In Matter of Jacob . . . we construed . . . New York’s adoption statute,
to permit ‘the unmarried partner of a child’s biological mother, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, who is raising the child together with the biological parent [to] become the
child’s second parent by means of adoption.’”) (citing In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y.
1995)).
73. Id. at 190.
74. See Parentage Laws, supra note 42, at 267 (“Even where available, however,
recognition of a child’s family should not depend upon the family’s access to court
proceedings that require a lawyer and take two precious and limited commodities–time and
money.”); see also In re Kimberly Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1038 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 2005) (noting that the couple decided not to seek a second-parent adoption because they
did not want the child in legal limbo for the two years it would take to finalize the adoption).
75. See Parentage Laws, supra note 43, at 207.
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Same-sex couples likely do not even consciously consider the
importance of a second-parent adoption. Similar to many newlyweds who
find it unnecessary to sign pre-nuptial agreements because they could never
see the relationship dissolving, same-sex couples might not subject
themselves to the expensive, drawn out process of second-parent adoption
because they similarly are too blinded by love to ever consider the legal
ramifications should the couple break up.76 Thus, requiring a second-parent
adoption closes the door to maintaining relationships with both parents in
households headed by a same–sex couple for whom adoption may not be a
practical option for any number of reasons. Looking toward marital status
is no better a solution. While the court in Debra H. relied on an out-of-state
same-sex marriage, now with the passage of same-sex marriage legislation
in New York, it is clear that there is potential for New York courts to focus
erroneously on marital status as the sought after “bright line” rule for
ascertaining parentage for lesbian non-biological parents. While arguably
less burdensome than requiring a second-parent adoption, neither rule is
ideal.
Judge Kaye, dissenting in Alison D., warned that the best interest of
the child is ignored by requiring second-parent adoption because it “limit[s]
[the child’s] opportunity to maintain bonds that may be crucial to their
development.”77 Thus, Judge Kaye would have remanded Alison D. for the
lower court to assess Alison’s parenthood based on a theory of in loco
parentis to see if it was in the best interest of the child to allow visitation.78
This is similar to what the Court of Appeals should have done in Debra H.;
and, in fact, it is what the trial court did by applying principles of equity to
find Debra H. a de facto parent.79
76. See A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 n.6 (Mass. 2006) (“The plaintiff stated
that she had no sense of urgency to formalize the relationship to the child because she never
imagined a possible threat to her parental status . . . she viewed the adoption as a formality
necessary only in the unlikely event of a ‘worst case scenario.’”).
77. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 658 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 654 (stating that gay couples are the “functional equivalent of biological
parents”).
79. See Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 WL 7675822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
2, 2008) (holding that the equitable estoppel doctrine could be invoked to bar a child’s
biological mother from denying the partner’s parental relationship). The court noted:
The facts as alleged by petitioner, if found to be true, establish a prima facie
basis for invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel . . . . Of particular
significance are her allegations that the parties moved in together and
consulted an adoption attorney prior to M.R’s birth, sent out birth
announcements together, were both listed as M.R.’s parents on the childnaming certificate and on some of M.R.’s school and camp documents, and

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

233

Such an equity-based approach to parentage would parallel the Court
of Appeals’ approach to parentage determination in H.M.,80 thereby
properly placing parentage standards for child custody/visitation standing in
parity with parentage for adjudicating child support.
The divergence between New York’s parentage determination in
lesbian family child custody/visitation and child support cases grew in H.M.
where the court applied a similar equitable parentage determination as in
Shondel J. 81 In Shondel J.,82 the New York Court of Appeals held that
despite a lack of genetic connection, the doctrine of equitable estoppel
prohibited a man who had held himself out to be the father of a child from
denying paternity for purposes of paying child support.83 In H.M., H.M.
and her partner E.T. “planned to conceive and raise a child together,
discussing, among other things, available methods of conception, childrearing practices, and whether the child would be raised as a sibling of
E.T.’s children from a prior relationship.”84 After several failed attempts,
H.M. finally became pregnant by artificial insemination through a
procedure E.T. performed and helped finance.85 E.T. was present in the
delivery room at birth, and participated in the child’s care until the couple
ended their relationship four months later.86
Following more of an Alison D.-type parentage determination, the
New York Appellate Division denied jurisdiction to entertain H.M.’s
petition for child support, highlighting the fact that “H.M. [was] never
married to or in a civil union with E.T., [and yet] seeks to have E.T., a
that petitioner was present in the delivery room at M.R.’s birth and cut his
umbilical cord, and that M.R. was given petitioner’s last name as a middle
name on his original birth certificate.
Id.
80. H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 208–09 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that Family Court had
subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate biological mother’s petition for child support).
81. See id. at 213 (“Shondel J. makes clear that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is
applicable, in the child support context, only to preclude a party’s reliance on genetic marker
and DNA testing to prove or disprove paternity when such an approach is warranted to
prevent disruption of an ongoing parent/child relationship”).
82. Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that equitable
estoppel prohibited a man from denying paternity, even when DNA results indicated that he
was not the child’s biological father).
83. See id. (“[A] man who has mistakenly represented himself as a child’s father may
be estopped from denying paternity, and made to pay child support, when the child
justifiably relied on the man’s representation of paternity, to the child’s detriment.”).
84. H.M., 930 N.E.2d at 207.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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woman having no biological or legal connection to the subject child,
adjudicated a parent of that child and required to pay child support.”87 The
New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lower family court
could hear a claim from H.M. that E.T., the non-biological and nonadoptive partner, is liable for child support.88 Far from the court’s analysis
in Debra H., the Court of Appeals in H.M. focused heavily on equitable
considerations.89 The court did not even acknowledge that the defendant
was not a “legal” parent under Alison D.90 Although the court recognized it
was not ruling on whether or not the non-biological parent was a “legal
parent” and instead ruling on jurisdictional grounds that the Family Court
should consider the matter, the court had a clear and easy opportunity to
reinforce Alison D. as it did in Debra H., yet in the child support context it
failed to do so.
Judge Smith, concurring in both Debra H. and H.M., acknowledged
that “[both cases] present (though neither majority decision ultimately turns
on) the question of whether a person other than a biological or adoptive
mother or father may be a ‘parent’ under New York law.”91 Although
agreeing with the ultimate outcome in both—recognizing Debra H.’s
parental status under the law of Vermont and providing jurisdiction in
family court to adjudicate child support—Judge Smith was rightfully
concerned about the divergent nature of the underlying basis for
adjudicating parentage in each. For that reason, Judge Smith advocated
departing from Alison D., both for visitation and child support.92 Although
acknowledging the need for predictability and certainty in cases of parental
rights and obligations, Judge Smith felt that this should not overshadow the
desire to act in the best interest of the child to maintain important childparent relationships.93 Judge Ciparick also expressed concern that “the
87. See H.M. v. E.T., 881 N.Y.S.2d 113, 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
88. See H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 209 (N.Y. 2010) (“In short, because H.M.
asserts that E.T. is the child’s parent, and is therefore chargeable with the child’s support,
this case is within the Family Court’s article 4 jurisdiction.”).
89. Id. at 209.
90. Id. (ruling majority that the New York Family Court does have jurisdiction to hear
a child support action, even though the statutes refer to “parents” and under the precedent of
Alison D. there was no parental relationship present).
91. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 203 (N.Y. 2010) (Smith, J., concurring).
92. See id. at 204 (“I grant that there is much to be said for reaffirming Alison D., but I
conclude that there is even more to be said against it.”).
93. See id. (“I have said that the interest in certainty is extremely strong in this area;
but society’s interest in assuring, to the extent possible, that each child begins life with two
parents is not less so.”).
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[Debra H.] majority sees no ‘inconsistency in applying equitable
estoppel . . . for purposes of support, but not to create standing when
visitation and child custody are sought . . . .’”94 Judge Ciparick eloquently
described how “the duty to support and the rights of parentage go hand in
hand and it is nonsensical to treat the two things as severable.”95 Finally,
Judge Jones, dissenting in H.M., stated most authoritatively that “the
position taken by the majority [in H.M.] is inconsistent with [the] Court’s
holding today in Debra H.”96
In their concurrences, Judge Smith and Judge Ciparick both propose
alternative parentage standards, based more on the court’s common law and
equitable powers, to replace Alison D., Both of these are further discussed
in the possible solutions discussion of Part VI. Judge Smith proposed a
version of a solution discussed in Part VI.A.i.: “where a child is conceived
through [artificial insemination] by one member of a same-sex couple
living together, with the knowledge and consent of the other, the child is as
a matter of law—at least in the absence of extraordinary circumstances—
the child of both.”97 Judge Ciparick proposed a version of a solution I
discuss in Part VI.A.ii. In addition to biological and adopting parents,
Judge Ciparick would also bestow parentage on an individual who can
show that: (1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to and
encouraged the formation of a parental relationship; and, (2) the petitioner
intended to and actually did assume the typical obligations and roles
associated with parenting the child.98 Both of these, Judge Smith focusing
more on consent to insemination, and Judge Ciparick focusing more on
intent and de facto/functional parenthood, are viable options and preferable
to Alison D. and to the potential desire, seen in Debra H., to rely on marital
status.
V. Discussion and Evaluation of Preferable Parentage Theories to Apply in
Both Contexts
Below I briefly describe possible parentage theories that should be
applied in the context of lesbian families to determine parentage both in
94. Id. at 201–02 (Ciparick, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 202.
96. H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 214 (N.Y. 2010) (Jones, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 211.
98. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 202–03 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J.,
concurring) (listing ways one could demonstrate parentage).
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actions for child custody/visitation as well as actions for child-support. It is
important to have one standard for both so as to ensure that there is not one
definition of legal parenthood for the purposes of adjudicating child
custody/visitation, and then a completely different standard when deciding
child support. After a brief description, I evaluate each theory and stress
the importance of focusing on the relationship between child and partner
and less on the relationship between the partners.
A. Read Applicable Parentage Statutes in a Gender-Neutral Way
i. Assisted Reproduction Statutes
Many states have enacted laws, or developed doctrines through the
court’s common law and equitable powers, to grant automatic legal
parentage to a woman’s husband who consents to her artificial
insemination.99 Read in a gender-neutral way, these should apply to samesex couples if they are in a legally recognized same-sex marriage or
marriage-like arrangement.100 Several state courts have gone a step further
and formally and explicitly extended these statutes and doctrines to lesbian
couples.101 For example, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed the legal
parentage of a child born through assisted reproduction to a same-sex
couple in a civil union and held that both spouses were the legal parents of
the resulting child.102 The court stated that “[i]f Janet had been Lisa’s
husband, these factors would make Janet the parent of the child born from
the artificial insemination” and because Vermont law requires “the equality
99. See Hopkins, supra note 20, at 221–22 (discussing different state laws that
automatically grant legal parentage to husbands who consent to artificial insemination).
100. See sources and discussion supra Part II.
101. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2011) (“The rights and obligations of
registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as
those of spouses.”); see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005)
(noting in dicta that children born to registered domestic partners are considered the legal
children of both partners); see also Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App.
2009) (noting that “[t]here appears to be no reason for permitting heterosexual couples to
bypass adoption proceedings by conceiving a child through mutually consensual artificial
insemination, but not permitting same-sex couples to do the same”).
102. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 970 (Vt. 2006), cert. denied,
550 U.S. 918 (2007) (holding, in part, that a couple in a same-sex union were both parents
because the child had been artificially inseminated within the biological mother with the
expectation that both partners would parent the child, and both partners acted as parents to
the child).
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of treatment of partners in civil unions,” the same result must be true as to a
same-sex civil union spouse.103
However, there are still a majority of states that do not legally
recognize same-sex relationships. Thus, the focus on the legal status of the
same-sex couple makes the widespread implementation of this solution
problematic. The reliance on marital status in this solution also makes it no
better than that employed by the New York Court of Appeals. Courts
should be looking more at the relationship between the child and purported
parent and less at the relationship between the same-sex couple.104
Marriage should never play an important role; courts certainly do not
hesitate to enforce child support obligations on biological, but unwed
parents of children “who are conceived by accident.”105 Thus, including
marital status in a parentage doctrine or statute is arguably unconstitutional
since it discriminates against children of non-married couples. Such
discrimination against “illegitimate” children of non-married couples—the
status of most children in same-sex families since the majority of states do
not recognize same-sex relationships106—has long been ruled
unconstitutional. A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions between 1968
and 1983 and the enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)
eliminated legal discrimination based on the “legitimacy” of a child.107 The
103. Id. at 970.
104. See, e.g., In re Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036 1041−42 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005)
(noting the state’s artificial insemination statute required marriage, and thus only extended
the statute to the lesbian couple at hand because the child was born in the context of a samesex Canadian marriage).
105. Hopkins, supra note 20, at 240.
106. See sources cited supra Part II (discussing instances in which courts have found
such discrimination to be unconstitutional).
107. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (striking down a six-year old
Pennsylvania statute limiting the time to bring a support action for non-marital children,
because the statute did not withstand the heightened scrutiny test under the Equal Protection
Clause when compared to support rights of marital children); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535,
539 (1973) (holding that there was a constitutional duty of both parents to support a nonmarital child, once paternity had been proved); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 165 (1972) (holding that a non-marital child could also recover under state worker’s
compensation laws); Levy v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 68, 70–72 (1968) (holding that non-marital
children were clearly persons within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, and it would be “invidious to discriminate against them”); see
also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 202 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 309 (Supp. 2010) (“A child born to
parents who are not married to each other has the same rights under the law as a child born
to parents who are married to each other.”); Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between
Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L. J. 141, 154 (2004) (discussing the recent
decision of the Supreme Court to recognize children as “persons”).
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UPA includes Section 202, which states that a child born to parents who are
not married to each other has the same rights under the law as a child born
to parents who are married to each other.108 More specifically, with regard
to child support, the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution requires
states to enforce child support regardless of whether the parents of the child
were ever married.109
Rather than focus on the same-sex couple’s legal status, parentage
statutes and court-applied doctrines should focus more on parental behavior
and the connection between the purported parent and child. Judge Smith
recognized this in his proposed solution in Debra H., focusing on consent to
insemination and intent to parent rather than focusing on the legal status of
the parents’ relationship.110 When a child is conceived through the process
of artificial insemination into a union of two women, “the decision to create
the child is even more conscious and deliberate than the decision that is
made by some couples who are both biological parents and conceive a child
by direct sexual intercourse.”111 It demonstrates a well-thought-out
decision and steadfast commitment to care for and support the child. Thus,
under an ideal artificial insemination statute, the consenting non-biological
parent with intent to parent the child would be presumed to be a legal
mother of the child, irrespective of the legal status of the couple’s
relationship, which could only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.112 In the absence of any such evidence, the partner would be
legally defined as a parent, and from that legal status, derive both the right
to seek custody/visitation as well as the obligation to provide child support.
Legislation in the District of Columbia and New Mexico—the former
in a jurisdiction that legally recognized same-sex marriage, the latter in a
jurisdiction that does not—provide good models for an ideal assistedreproduction statute of the sort I propose. The D.C. legislation reads: “A
person who consents to the artificial insemination . . . with the intent to be
108. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 202.
109. See Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538 (holding that once a state posits a judicially
enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers, denying
such an essential right to a child simply because her natural father has not married her
mother violates the Equal Protection Clause).
110. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 204 (N.Y. 2010) (Smith, J., concurring).
111. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1254 (Mass. 2004) (Greaney, J., dissenting)
(quoting a lower court’s decision).
112. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 667 (Cal. 2005) (discussing how the
court in Nicholas H. concluded that the fact that the presumed father may not be the
biological father may be, rather than is, rebutted in an appropriate action by clear and
convincing evidence).
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the parent of her child, is conclusively established as a parent of the
resulting child.”113 Similarly, the New Mexico statute reads: “A person
who . . . consents to assisted reproduction . . . with the intent to be the
parent of a child is a parent of the resulting child.”114 Both correctly focus
on the deliberate and intentional participation in the decision to bring a
child into the world rather than on the legal status of the same-sex couple.
Both are also gender-neutral and therefore apply equally to same-sex
couples. In 2008, The American Bar Association lent its approval to this
type of statutory language by approving a Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology: “An individual who . . . consents to assisted
reproduction by a woman . . . with the intent to be a parent of her child is a
parent of the resulting child.”115 This would be the most ideal solution; it is
clear, easily applicable, and more of a “bright line” rule than other solutions
I discuss below. However, despite its virtues, this solution requires
legislative action, and in a climate in which most states still do not
recognize same-sex marriage, passing such a wide-reaching, gender-neutral
statute is not a political reality.
ii. Holding Out Provisions in State Family Law Statutes
Most state parentage laws are based on the Uniform Parentage Act
(“UPA”).116 The UPA includes a “holding out” presumption, which many
113. D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1) (2001); see also D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1)(A), (B)
(2001) (describing when the parent-child relationship is conclusively established). The code
states:
(A) Consent by a woman, and a person who intends to be a parent of a child
born to the woman by artificial insemination, shall be in writing signed by
the woman and the intended parent. (B) Failure of a person to sign a consent
required by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, before or after the birth of
the child, shall not preclude a finding of intent to be a parent of the child if
the woman and the person resided together in the same household with the
child and openly held the child out as their own.
Id.
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (West 2010).
115. AM. BAR ASS’N, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
§
603
(Proposed
Official
Draft
2008),
http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf (last visited April 8, 2012)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
116. Unif. Law Comm’n, Parentage Act Summary, http://uniformlaws.org/Act
Summary.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited April 8, 2012) (summarizing the Act and
the history of the Act) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice). The Uniform Law Commission (ULC), previously known as the National
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states have incorporated into their own parentage laws.117 The “holding
out” presumption is a provision that establishes a presumption of parentage
for a man if, “while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.”118
Thus far, California is the only state that has addressed whether such a
holding out can be read in a gender neutral way and applied to a woman in
a same-sex relationship.119 In Elisa B. v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court determined that the non-biological parent, Elisa, was a legal
parent under California’s holding out presumption because she received the
children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children.120
The court concluded that the parentage presumption was not rebutted
simply by the fact that she was not the biological parent.121 In so acting, the
judges focused on the best interest of the child in establishing a child-parent
relationship, regardless of the marital status of the parents.122 Specifically,
the court spoke of the fact that Elisa “actively participated in causing the
children to be conceived with the understanding that she would raise the
children as her own together with the birth mother” and also that after birth,
she “voluntarily accepted the rights and obligations of parenthood.”123 Both
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), promulgated a version of
the UPA in 1973. Id. The Act reflects both federal requirements and state best practices in
the paternity area. Id. Fourteen states have adopted a version of the 1973 UPA: Alabama,
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington. Id. The NCCUSL approved a new
version of the UPA in 2002. Id. Only nine states have formally enacted a version of the
most recent UPA: Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. Although other states have not formally adopted the
UPA, it still influences the creation of state parentage laws. Id.; see also Unif. Law
Comm’n,
Legislative
Fact
Sheet
–
Parentage
Act,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet
.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited April 8, 2012) (listing states that have adopted the
Act) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
117. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 4(a)(4) (1973).
118. Id.
119. See CAL. FAM. CODE §7611(d) (West 2004) (stating that a man is presumed to be a
parent of a child if “he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child, and noting that California’s “holding out” provision is based on Section 4 of
the 1973 UPA).
120. See Elisa B. v. Super. Court, 117 P.3d 660, 669–73 (Cal. 2005) (stating that Elisa
consented to co-parent the children with her partner as her natural children).
121. See id.
122. See id. at 669 (noting that the legislature has “implicitly recognized the value of
having two parents, rather than one, as a source of both emotional and financial support,
especially when the obligation to support the child would otherwise fall to the public”).
123. Id. at 670.
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parties breast-fed the children, chose the children’s names—giving them all
hyphenated combination of their surnames— and co-parented the children
until they were approximately two years old.124 Justice Kennard, in his
concurring opinion, put it well: “Had a man who, like Elisa, lacked any
biological connection to the twins received them into his home and held
them out as his natural children, this case would . . . undoubtedly have
resulted in determination that he met the statutory criteria for being the
presumed father of the twins.”125
In terms of the sufficient amount of time a parent must “hold out” a
child as her own before considered a “legal parent” under the “holding out”
presumption, in Charisma R. v. Kristina S., the California Court of Appeal
held that Charisma was entitled to a presumption of parentage even though
she co-parented the child for only thirteen weeks.126 With regard to the
short duration, the court emphasized that “[o]n its face, the [California]
statute contains no durational requirement; it does not, for example, state
that the child must be received or held out ‘for a significant period of
time.’“127
This is a solution with much potential, especially since the presence of
the 1973 UPA “holding out” presumption, or something similar, is quite
widespread across the 50 states.128 In addition, nine states have adopted the
2002 version of the UPA which also includes a holding out provision;
however, unlike the open-ended 1973 version, the 2002 version has a
specific durational requirement, providing that the person must have lived
with and held the child out as her own for the first two years of the child’s
life.129

124. Id. at 663.
125. Id. at 673 (Kennard, J., concurring).
126. Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)
(concluding that the presumption of parentage is not limited by duration).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (West 2010) (stating that a
man, who holds a child under the age of majority out to be his, is presumed to be the natural
father); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-4(a)(4) (West 2010) (same); IND. CODE ANN. 31-14-7-2(a)
(West 2010) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55(1)(d) (West 2010) (same); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 168-B:3(I)(d) (West 2010) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 126.051(1)(d) (West 2010)
(same); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-43(a)(4)–(5) (West 2010) (same); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2107(c)(2) (West 2010) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304(4) (West 2010) (same).
129. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 204(a)(5) (2002) (“[A] man is presumed to be the
father of a child if . . . for the first two years of the child’s life, he resided in the same
household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.”); see also sources cited
supra note 129 (noting the coinciding state statutes).
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There are, however, several issues with this solution. First, it requires
courts to read the state’s holding out provision in a gender-neutral way.
Additionally, while the “holding out” presumption appropriately looks at
the relationship between the child and parent rather than between the
parents, it focuses too much on post-birth behavior. This is a concern
shared by many of the equity-based solutions. Under these parental
theories, it may be difficult for the non-birth parent to seek
custody/visitation, and likewise for the biological parent to seek support, if
the couple ended their relationship prior to the birth of the child. For
example, in two cases in which the lesbian couple terminated their
relationship prior to the birth of children conceived through alternative
insemination, appellate courts in both Massachusetts and Washington
concluded that the non-birth partner was not a legal parent and did not have
any legal obligation to support the resulting child.130 This solution would,
perhaps, be stronger if more weight were placed on the intent to have a
child in the first place, by, for example, looking at consent to the partner’s
artificial insemination, attendance at birthing classes, and other pre-birth
behavior. Thus, holding out statutes, as a solution, could be strengthened
by focusing on more than just post-birth behavior.
B. Utilize Common Law Equitable Doctrines
In the absence of the possible statutory-based solutions discussed
above, common law equitable considerations should be applied to
determine parentage for both child custody/visitation and child support for a
parent with no biological, adoptive, or other legal connection to the child.
Courts have long recognized their authority “in the absence of legislative
mandates . . . [to] construct a fair, workable and responsible basis for
protection of children, aside from whatever rights the adults may have vis a
vis each other.”131 Therefore, courts in a growing number of states have
applied long standing common law or equitable doctrines, including in loco
parentis, de facto parenthood, psychological parent, or parenthood by
130. See T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1253 (Mass. 2004) (determining that the
cohabitant is not considered a legal parent and therefore is not financially obligated to the
child); see also State ex rel. D.R.M., 34 P.3d 887, 890–92 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (declaring
that the cohabitant neither legally adopted the child nor engaged in a commitment ceremony
with the biological mother, and is therefore neither a legal parent nor financially responsible
for the child).
131. L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (relying on equitable
considerations to bestow parental responsibility).
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estoppel to conclude that a person who is not in a biological or adoptive
relationship with a child, but who has functioned as a parent, is entitled to
some rights and responsibilities with respect to the child.132 While
preferable to the extremely narrow marriage or second-parent adoption
parentage standard set in Debra H., it is important to note that adjudicating
parenthood under statutory “holding out” provisions in the state’s family
law or under a gender-neutral reading of an artificial insemination statute is
preferable to the application of common law and equitable doctrines
because persons found to be protected under equitable and common law
doctrines might not be granted full legal parental status.
i. Psychological Parent
The Colorado Court of Appeals held that a “psychological parent” is a
person with whom the child has “deep emotional bonds such that the child
recognizes the person, independent of the legal form of the relationship, as
a parent from whom they receive daily guidance and nurturance.”133
Alaska, New Jersey, New Mexico, and West Virginia, among others, also

132. See, e.g., Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 71 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding
that a lesbian co-parent had standing to seek custody where the parties had jointly planned
for the birth of the child and had jointly parented the child after the child's birth); In re L.B.,
122 P.3d 161, 178 (Wash. 2005) (holding that a woman who had co-parented a child with
her same-sex partner was a de facto parent and, therefore, stood "in parity with biological
and adoptive parents in [Washington State]"); In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 157 (W.
Va. 2005) (holding that, in exceptional circumstances, a "psychological parent" may
intervene in a custody proceeding); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562 (Colo. App. 2004)
(holding that a lesbian co-parent had standing to seek custody where the legal parent
consented to, and fostered, the formation of a bonded parent-child relationship between the
child and the parent's former partner); T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 917 (Pa. 2001)
(holding that a lesbian co-parent had standing to seek custody under the in loco parentis
doctrine, because, with the consent of the child's legal parent, she had assumed the
obligations incident to the parental relationship); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550 (N.J.
2000) (holding that a former same-sex partner had standing to seek custody or visitation as a
"psychological parent" because, with the consent of the legal parent, she had formed a
parent-child bond and had taken on the responsibilities of parenthood); Laspina-Williams v.
Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840, 844 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that a non-biological
lesbian co-parent had standing to seek visitation with the child, after demonstrating she
assumed a significant role in the child's life); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass.
1999) (holding that a former same-sex partner was a de facto parent entitled to seek
visitation and that a de facto parent is a person who, despite a lack of biological connection
to a child, lived with the child and, with the consent of the legal parent, functioned as a
parent to the child).
133. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 559.
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have utilized a “psychological parent” standard when adjudicating
parentage.134
ii. In Loco Parentis
While utilizing a different term, in loco parentis, states including
Arkansas, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania follow a
standard similar to “psychological parenthood” by looking at the
relationship between a child and a person who has acted as a parent but who
has no biological, adoptive, or other legal tie.135 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court first established the doctrine of in loco parentis, recognizing
parenthood for an individual who acts like a parent and voluntarily takes on
parental obligations as if she were a natural parent.136 Spells v. Spells first
formulated the in loco parentis doctrine:
[A] person may “put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by
assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship without
going through the formality of a legal adoption. [The status of in loco

134. See Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 154 (Alaska 2002) (finding that a
stepmother was the child’s psychological parent for purposes of determining custody of the
child as between the stepmother and her husband, who was child’s biological father); V.C.,
748 A.2d at 550 (finding that a biological mother’s same-sex former domestic partner had
standing to seek joint legal custody of, and visitation with, mother’s biological children, as
her former partner’s allegation that she was children’s psychological parent was sufficient to
invoke “exceptional circumstances” doctrine); In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d at 152 (“[A]
person may, subject to the exercise of the court’s discretion, intervene in a proceeding
adjudicating custody if the facts of the particular case warrant such intervention and if the
intervention is likely to promote the best interests of the child[ren].”); In re Adoption of
Francisco A., 866 P.2d 1175, 1182 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (evidence, including children’s
wishes, was insufficient to support award of visitation to former foster parent as a part of
adoption decree).
135. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, 196 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004),
aff’d, 208 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Ark. 2005) (granting a step-mother visitation rights under the in
loco parentis doctrine); King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965, 966–67 (Ind. 2005) (determining that
King acted in loco parentis and is financially obligated to the child); Logan v. Logan, 730
So. 2d 1124,1126 (Miss. 1998) (determining that a parent who treats child as his own is
considered to be acting in loco parentis); Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 61 (Neb.
2002) (finding that the lower court erred for not considering appellant’s in loco parentis
status); T.B., 786 A.2d at 914 (applying the in loco parentis doctrine to construct parental
status).
136. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 502 (1990) (stating that the doctrine creates rights in one who
voluntarily provides support) [hereinafter Redefining Parenthood].
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parentis] embodies two ideas first, the assumption of a parental status,
and second, the discharge of parental duties.”137

iii. De Facto Parenthood
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington, and
Wisconsin, among others, use the term de facto parent or custodian, to
describe a person who has functioned as a child’s parent and established a
parent-child bond.138 In a decision often cited by other courts, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H-K. established a fourpart test for demonstrating a de facto parent relationship: (1) whether the
legal parent consented to or fostered the relationship between the de facto
parent and the child; (2) whether the de facto parent lived with the child; (3)
whether the de facto parent assumed the obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education, and
development, including contributing towards the child’s support, without
expectation of financial compensation; and, (4) whether a parent-child bond
was formed.139 Courts in New Jersey, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and
Washington, among others, have directly adopted this test.140 Courts in
other states have adopted similar versions of this test.141 However, like the
137. Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
138. See, e.g., C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1147 (Me. 2004) (stating that the
person who parented the child equal to that of the biological parent, is a de facto parent);
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 899 (Mass. 1999) (deeming a lesbian partner a de facto
parent based upon her behavior toward biological and child); Soohoo v. Johnson, 731
N.W.2d 815, 822–24 (Minn. 2007); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 61 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008) (determining that declaring someone a de facto parent can be in the child’s best
interest); In re L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 175–76 (Wash. 2005) (stating that the scope of the statute
is not limited by gender and extends to de facto parents); Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d
419, 420 (Wisc. 1995) (remanding the case to the lower court for not consider de facto
factors).
139. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 435–36 (providing a four-step test that demonstrates the
existence of a parent-like relationship with a child).
140. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550 (N.J. 2000) (adopting the best interest test
for determining de facto parents); Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 743–44 (S.C. 2008)
(applying the four-prong best interest test for determining de facto parents); Carvin v.
Britain, 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (adopting the best interest test for determining de
facto parents).
141. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 552 (Colo. App. 2004) (applying a strict
scrutiny test for statutes that possibly infringe on parental rights); E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 890
(determining that the best interest test controls); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1318 (Pa.
1996) (applying a substantial and immediate test to determine de facto parenthood); In re
Jonathan G., 482 S.E.2d 893, 912–13 (W. Va. 1996) (determining that a child may have a
continuing relationship with a non-biological parent if it is considered in his best interest).
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problems with the “holding out” solution, this theory of parentage focuses
heavily on post-birth behavior and might prove problematic if the
relationship dissolved before the child’s birth.
iv. Equitable Estoppel
Courts have also followed principles of equitable estoppel in
determining parentage by looking at pre-conception and post-birth behavior
to determine whether a reasonable expectation was formed that the nonbiological, non-adoptive parent would support the child.142 Even though
courts have so far used this theory to enforce child support based on a
theory of reliance, there is no reason this should not also be used as a
parentage standard in child custody/visitation cases.143 In the first appellate
court decision in the nation to apply the estoppel doctrine in the child
support context, L.S.K. v. H.A.N.,144 the Pennsylvania Superior Court found
sufficient facts to infer that the partner’s actions—both pre-conception and
post birth—financially and emotionally caused the mother to form a
reasonable expectation that the partner would support the child.145 The
court explained that equitable estoppel is a doctrine of fundamental fairness
designed to preclude a party from depriving another of a reasonable
expectation when the party inducing the expectation knew or should have
known that the other party would rely upon that conduct to his or her
detriment.146 Thus, the court used the estoppel doctrine to preclude a former
domestic partner from defending against paying child support by arguing
that a lack of biological connection prevented a child support obligation.147
The Superior Court focused on how H.A.N. “acted as a ‘co-parent’ . . . in
142. Courts have determined that equitable estoppel can support child support
enforcement without a biological relation and it should generally be extended to parentage
determination. See, e.g., Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 615 (N.Y. 2006); S.K. v.
H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (2002); Rubano v. Dicenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000); J.C. v.
C.T., 184 Misc. 2d 935, 711 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Fam. Ct. 2000).
143. See Hopkins, supra note 20, at 234 (stating that estoppel that is used to obligate a
non-biological parent to pay child support should also be used to create a parentage
standard).
144. L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (applying the doctrine
of estoppel to bind the domestic partner to pay child support).
145. See id. at 877–79 (describing the factors that led the biological parent to
reasonably believe that her partner would continue to support the child).
146. See id. at 877 (describing equitable estoppel).
147. See Hopkins, supra note 20, at 235 (referencing L.S.K. v. H.A.N.’s application of
the estoppel doctrine).
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all areas concerning the children’s conception, care and support.”148
Besides agreeing to have children through artificial insemination, H.A.N.
was an active participant in childbirth classes and in the delivery room
itself, as well as assisted in selecting the names of the children.149 After
birth she stayed home with the children while L.S.K. continued her career;
therefore, H.A.N. was intimately involved in the children’s day-to-day care
and schooling as well as health needs for over eight years.150
v. American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution
Despite differences in terminology, the equitable doctrines discussed
above in sections I through IV generally have similar focuses and describe a
person who does not have a biological, adoptive, or other legally
recognized relationship with the child, but who should be entitled to seek
parental rights and protections by virtue of having established an actual
parent-child relationship.151 While state courts generally use the terms
“psychological parent,” in loco parentis, de facto parent, and “parent by
estoppel” interchangeably, the drafters of the ALI Principles of Family
Dissolution (ALI Principles)152 distinguished these terms from one another.
The ALI Principles narrow the definition of de facto parent and gives the
terms “parent by estoppel” and “de facto” parent significantly different
meanings.153 The ALI Principles also explicitly give de facto parentage a
lesser status than parentage by estoppel.154
The ALI Principles might prove confusing since they adopt the same
terms utilized by state courts, but with different meanings. Most courts
that use the term “de facto parent” give it a broader meaning, similar to
what the ALI Principles refer to as a “parent by estoppel.” For illustration,
148. L.S.K., 813 A.2d at 878.
149. See id. at 878 (describing H.A.N.’s parental-like efforts).
150. Id.
151. See Carvin v. Britain, 122 P.3d 161, 168 n.7 (Wash. 2005) (“Our cases, and cases
from other jurisdictions, interchangeably and inconsistently apply the related yet distinct
terms of in loco parentis, psychological parent, and de facto parent.”); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748
A.2d 539, 546 n. 3 (N.J. 2000) (observing that “the terms psychological parent, de facto
parent, and functional parent are used interchangeably”).
152. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (2002) [hereinafter ALI Principles].
153. See id. (defining a parent by estoppel and a de facto parent).
154. Id.

248

18 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 215 (2012)

the Washington Supreme Court’s four-factor test to establish de facto
parenthood is nearly identical to the criteria for parentage by estoppel under
the ALI Principles.155 The ALI Principles define a parent by estoppel, in
relevant part, as:
An individual who, though not a legal parent, . . . lived with the child
since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent
responsibilities as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement
with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both
parents) to raise a child together each with full parental rights and
responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the individual
as a parent is in the child’s best interests; or . . . lived with the child for
at least two years, holding out and accepting full and permanent
responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child’s
parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court
finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best
interests.156

Thus, under the ALI Principles, a person can become a parent by estoppel
only where the child’s legal parent has agreed to share full parental rights
and responsibilities, and only when the court finds that recognition as a
parent is in the child’s best interests. Similar to de facto parenthood as it is
understood by most states, a parent by estoppel under the ALI Principles
stands in legal parity with a legal parent, whether biological, adoptive, or
otherwise.157
In contrast, the ALI Principles define de facto parent, in relevant part,
as someone, other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel, who has lived
with the child for at least two years and:
for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the
agreement of the legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a
result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform
caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed a majority of the
caretaking functions for the child, or (B) regularly performed a share of
the caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom
the child primarily lived.158

155. See In re L.B., 122 P.3d 161, at 176–77 (Wash. 2005) (citing the four-part test first
articulated in In re H.S.H.-K.; see also Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wisc. 1995)).
156. ALI Principles, § 2.03(1).
157. See id. (listing factors that determine a legal parent under estoppel).
158. Id. at § 2.03(1)(c).
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Under the ALI Principles definition, a de facto parent may not be awarded a
majority of custodial responsibility for the child if a legal parent or parent
by estoppel is fit and willing to care for the child.159
Despite confusing differences in the definitions of these doctrines, the
main components of all these equitable theories are the same under the ALI
Principles as under the common state court definitions discussed above.
There are, however, differences in terms of the legal consequences attached
to the theory by which an individual is determined to be a parent. In sum,
under the ALI Principles, a parent by estoppel is someone who has entered
into an agreement with the legal parent to assume full, permanent, and coequal parental responsibility for a child and who has the same rights and
responsibilities as a legal parent. A de facto parent is someone who
develops a parent-like relationship with a child as a result of stepping in to
perform caretaking functions; therefore, de facto parentage is a lesser status
and provides fewer rights than legal parentage or parentage by estoppel.160
Unlike Debra H.’s reliance on Alison D., which requires same-sex
couples in New York to have a formalized second-parent adoption, or the
worrisome fact that the court in Debra H. ultimately found legal
parenthood based on the same-sex couple’s out-of-state civil union, the
alternative solutions discussed in this section are preferable in that they
protect children’s important relationships with parents who are not in a
legal same-sex relationship that bestows automatic parental rights and
obligations and either cannot or do not take steps to formalize their parentchild bonds through adoption. These solutions all focus more on the
relationship between the child and putative parent.
New York, in fact, is out of step with most state courts, which reject an
Alison D.-type parentage standard, holding instead that a person’s inability
or failure to adopt is not a bar to establishing parentage, and likewise reject
a Debra H.-type parentage standard that finds legal parentage by way of the
same-sex couple’s marital status.161 For example, the Pennsylvania
159. See id. at § 2.18(1)(a) (stating that the court should not give de facto parents the
majority of custodial rights if the biological parent objects).
160. See Sarah H. Ramsey, Constructing Parenthood for Stepparents: Parents by
Estoppel and De Facto Parents Under the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 285, 291–93 (2001) (explaining the
rights accorded to parents by estoppels and de facto parents, respectively).
161. See generally Debra L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third Parties, or
Parents? The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for Parental Equality, 40 FAM.
L.Q. 23, 46 (2006) (“If we look at these cases from the children’s perspective, it becomes
clearer that whether the partner adopted or not, the completion of a formal adoption seems
beside the point, especially if she functioned as a parent and developed the resulting
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Supreme Court has held that: “[t]he ability to marry the biological parent
and the ability to adopt the subject child have never been and are not now
factors in determining whether the third party assumed a parental status and
discharged parental duties.”162 Similarly, the Vermont Supreme Court has
rejected the view that couples who use assisted reproduction should be
required to adopt in order to gain parental status, recognizing “[t]he
disruption that would be caused by requiring adoption of all children
conceived by artificial insemination.”163 The ALI Principles also expressly
state that “[n]either the unavailability of adoption nor the failure to adopt
when adoption would have been available forecloses parent-by-estoppel
status.”164
VI. Conclusion
Looking at Debra H. and H.M. together, one can clearly see an
alarming development: eliminating the applicability of equitable principles
to provide legal parental status for a non-biological, non-adoptive parent to
contest custody/visitation, while at the same time relying on such principles
to force child support payments on the same individuals. Not only are there
significant deficiencies in the court’s parentage standards, but also, it is
problematic to apply different parentage standards depending on the
particular child-related legal context. Child visitation jurisprudence and
child support jurisprudence should stand in parity, making it so an
individual would simply be adjudicated a parent, not a parent solely for
contesting child custody/visitation or a parent solely for child support.
Otherwise, not only is the best interest of the child lost, but so, too, is the
principle of fundamental fairness on the part of the defendant partner.
Now, establishing that the standard should be the same, the question
then becomes what is the most appropriate standard? It is easy to see the
court’s valuing judicial efficiency and “bright line” rule objectivity and
clarity over ensuring the best interest of the child, although such valuation
defies the very foundations of family law. The desire to solve this
complicated jurisprudential mess by relying on a simple standard—legal
marriage or legal adoption—to ascertain both child custody/visitation and
psychological attachment with the child.”).
162. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 918–20 (Pa. 2001).
163. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 968 (Vt. 2006), cert. denied, 550
U.S. 918 (2007).
164. ALI Principles, supra note 152, at Comment b (iii).
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child support is clearly a strong one. However, it must be resisted; relying
on any of the solutions articulated for both custody/visitation and support is
not only preferable on the grounds that these solutions properly place more
emphasis on the best interests of the child, but also on the grounds that
these statutory-based and equity-based solutions provide a more reasonable
and fair proxy for biology in parental determinations that does not
discriminate against same-sex families by placing an emphasis on marital
status that the Supreme Court has long held unconstitutional in the
heterosexual family context. Ascertaining legal parentage for a same-sex
family is fundamentally different than that for a heterosexual family—a
DNA test will provide no assistance to the non-biological parent. However,
requiring marriage or a second-parent adoption is an improper,
disproportionately more burdensome, and discriminatory proxy for biology.
Marriage activists speak of the vulnerability of same-sex families and
the importance of legalizing same-sex marriage to protect them. What is
often lost in the public debate is that the struggle for marriage equality is a
fight for equal access to the institution of marriage. Thus, activists need to
stress that the goal is for a same-sex couple to have the same rights to
decide whether to marry or not. Failing to emphasize this, and instead
naively believing same-sex marriage brings only legal benefits and
protections for LGBT families, has grave potential for same-sex marriage to
be far from the legal panacea same-sex families across the country believe
it to be. Hopefully, this article is a warning sign, that through inappropriate
and misapplied family law doctrines, same-sex marriage could in a perverse
way turn back the family law clock to a point where children suffer for the
decision of their parents not to marry, at least for same-sex couples.
Without acknowledging this potential, discouraging it, and advocating for
alternatives, fighting so arduously for same-sex marriage to protect samesex family relationships, may instead, work to undermine them.

